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NOTES
EXAMINING MONTANA’S RIGHT TO ATTACK
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR CONVICTIONS AT
SENTENCING: STATE V. MAINE
Paul M. Leisher*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Maine,1 the Montana Supreme Court diverged from United
States Supreme Court precedent and ruled that a prior conviction cannot be
used to increase the punishment for a subsequent offense if the prior con-
viction is tainted by any kind of constitutional violation.2  In Burgett v.
Texas3 and U.S. v. Tucker,4 the U.S. Supreme Court held convictions ob-
tained in violation of a criminal defendant’s right to appointed counsel5
could not be used to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense.6  Mon-
tana, like most of the federal circuit courts,7 interpreted the language and
reasoning of Burgett and Tucker to forbid sentence enhancements based on
a prior conviction that violated any fundamental constitutional right.8  In
* Paul M. Leisher, candidate for J.D. 2014, The University of Montana School of Law.  The
author is grateful to all who helped to improve this article and is deeply grateful to everyone who made
this article possible in the first place (you know who you are).
1. State v. Maine, 255 P.3d 64 (Mont. 2011).
2. Id. at 73–74.
3. Burgett v. Tex., 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
4. U.S. v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115 (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335); Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447.
7. Alan C. Smith, More Than a Question of Forum: The Use of Unconstitutional Convictions to
Enhance Sentences Following Custis v. United States, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1323, 1328 (1995) (discussing
interpretation of Burgett and Tucker by federal circuit courts pre-Custis).
8. See State v. Okland, 941 P.2d 431, 434 (Mont. 1997).
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Custis v. United States,9 however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Gideon
violations are unique and a prior conviction cannot be challenged for viola-
tion of any other constitutional right, even the closely-related right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.10  In State v. Maine, the Montana Supreme Court
rejected Custis and held that Montana’s Constitution protects a defendant
from having his sentence enhanced based on any constitutionally infirm
prior conviction.11
The Montana Supreme Court wisely rejected Custis. Some rights are
so fundamental to the truth finding process that their violation renders any
resulting conviction unreliable.12  A defendant whose sentence is enhanced
based on an unreliable prior conviction is made to suffer punishment twice
for a conviction that was not reliable enough to punish him the first time.
Hence, faced with the choice of adopting or rejecting a rule that would
severely restrict a defendant’s ability to collaterally attack in a sentencing
proceeding the constitutionality of a prior conviction, the Montana Supreme
Court chose well.
However, not all of the rights in Article II of Montana’s Constitution
affect the reliability of convictions.  Some, such as the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures,13 and the right to not have excessive
punishments imposed,14 do not undermine the reliability of a conviction.
For that reason, the Montana Supreme Court may, in a future case, wish to
restrict the scope of Maine to only those prior convictions suffering from
constitutional infirmities that render the conviction unreliable.
This note explains how the right to collaterally attack prior convictions
at sentencing arose in the federal system and in Montana and assesses the
implications and potential future developments of the Maine holding.  Parts
II and III outline the federal and Montana jurisprudence that form the foun-
dation of the Court’s decision in Maine.  Part IV describes the legal and
factual background of Maine and the majority and dissenting opinions.  Part
V assesses Maine, first by examining Maine’s reasoning, then by exploring
probable implications of the holding, and finally by suggesting future re-
strictions the Court may wish to place on Maine.  Part VI concludes the
note.
9. Custis v. U.S., 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
10. Id. at 487.
11. Maine, 255 P.3d at 72–73.
12. See Satterwhite v. Tex., 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988) (discussing rights fundamental to a fair crimi-
nal process: “Some constitutional violations . . . by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness
of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless.”).
13. Mont. Const. art. II, § 11.
14. Mont. Const. art. II, § 22.
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/9
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 3 25-MAR-13 9:29
2013 STATE V. MAINE: ATTACKING PRIOR CONVICTIONS 185
II. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE
In Williams v. Oklahoma,15 the U.S. Supreme Court held the practice
of considering prior convictions in determining the sentence for a present
crime constitutionally permissible.16  A few years later, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,17 the Court held the Sixth Amendment (applied to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment) requires states to provide criminal defendants with
counsel if they cannot afford their own.
In Burgett, the Court decided whether a prior conviction obtained in
violation of Gideon was admissible at trial.18  Burgett was charged in Texas
with assault with the intent to murder and four charges of recidivism based
on prior convictions.19  Burgett faced life in prison if found guilty of both
the assault and recidivism.20  At trial, Burgett objected to the introduction
into evidence of a prior conviction for forgery in Tennessee.21   Burgett
argued the conviction was invalid because he had not waived his right to
counsel and the State of Tennessee had not provided him with an attorney
as required by Gideon.22  The trial court overruled the objection and al-
lowed the State to present the Tennessee conviction to the jury.23  On ap-
peal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found no error.24
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, found the trial court erred when it
admitted the unconstitutional conviction into evidence.25  The Court held:
To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be
used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for an-
other offense . . . is to erode the principle of that case.  Worse yet, since the
defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in
effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.26
Allowing consideration of a prior unconstitutional conviction, according to
the Court’s rationale, would renew the constitutional violation.  In dicta, the
Court also noted that it could not allow the renewed violation of “a specific
federal right,”27 language interpreted by some lower courts to mean any
constitutional right.28
15. Williams v. Okla., 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
16. Id. at 585.
17. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
18. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114.
19. Id. at 112.
20. Id. at 111.
21. Id. at 112.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 113.
24. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 113.
25. Id. at 114–115.
26. Id. at 115.
27. Id. at 116.
28. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1330.
3
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In U.S. v. Tucker, the Court revisited the question of using uncoun-
seled convictions to enhance the sentence for another offense, again finding
it impermissible but this time for a different reason.  The district court that
sentenced Tucker considered his three prior convictions when sentencing
him.29  Those convictions were subsequently found unconstitutional for vi-
olation of the right to appointed counsel.30  The Court held that Tucker’s
sentence could not stand because it was “[f]ounded at least in part upon
misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”31  In contrast to the Court’s
concern in Burgett about renewal of the constitutional violation, the Court’s
concern in Tucker appeared to be the unreliability of unconstitutional con-
victions.32
In both Burgett and Tucker, the prior convictions were found infirm
because they violated the right to appointed counsel.  Nevertheless, the
Court’s reasoning appeared to extend beyond just violations of the right to
appointed counsel, to also forbid consideration of prior convictions ob-
tained in violation of most any constitutional right.33  Most of the federal
circuit courts interpreted Burgett and Tucker this way and held they forbid
consideration of any unconstitutional conviction at sentencing, or at least
those convictions whose claimed constitutional violations raised doubts
about the reliability of the conviction.34
In Custis, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly considered the scope of
Burgett and Tucker and held that a defendant may only collaterally attack
convictions obtained in violation of the right to appointed counsel.35  Custis
was convicted of two federal felonies.36  The government moved to en-
hance his sentence based on three prior convictions.37  Custis claimed two
of the three prior convictions were infirm because of a variety of constitu-
tional defects, including ineffective assistance of counsel.38  The district
court rejected Custis’ claims and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence
enhancement.39
The Supreme Court addressed Custis’ claims under Burgett and Tucker
and found those cases applicable only to Gideon violations.40  The Court
29. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444.
30. Id. at 444–445.
31. Id. at 447.
32. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1328.
33. Id. at 1330.
34. Id. at 1330–1333.
35. Custis, 511 U.S. at 487.
36. Id. at 488.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 488.
39. Id. at 489.
40. Id. at 496.
4
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held the failure to appoint counsel unique among constitutional defects.41  It
based this finding on Johnson v. Zerbst,42 a 1938 decision that attributed
jurisdictional significance to the failure to appoint counsel.43  The Custis
Court then identified a “theme” starting in Johnson v. Zerbst and “running
through” Burgett and Tucker that held the failure to appoint counsel unique
among constitutional violations.44  The Court ultimately rested its decision
however, on two policy considerations: 1) with the exception of Gideon
violation claims, collateral attacks create untenable administrative burdens;
and 2) the importance of judgment finality.45  The Court noted that Gideon
claims do not create the same kinds of administrative burdens as other
claimed constitutional violations because they are generally easy to verify
from the judgment itself or an accompanying minute order.46
In 2001, in back-to-back cases, Daniels v. United States47 and Lack-
awanna County District Attorney v. Coss,48 the Court applied the Custis
holding to habeas corpus petitions challenging sentences enhanced by prior
convictions the petitioners claimed were unconstitutional.  Both cases ad-
dressed claims of constitutional violations other than the failure to appoint
counsel.  The Court refined the Custis holding into a concise rule:
[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its
own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they
were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the convic-
tion may be regarded as conclusively valid.49
In other words, a defendant may not attack a prior conviction during sen-
tencing proceedings.  The sole exception to this rule is for attacks based on
the claim that a prior conviction was obtained in violation of the right to
counsel.50
III. MONTANA JURISPRUDENCE
In Lewis v. State,51 the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged and
adopted the rule announced in Burgett, holding a conviction obtained in
41. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496.
42. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
43. Custis, 511 U.S. at 494.  Oddly, the Custis decision openly admits the Johnson v. Zerbst Court
attached jurisdictional significance to the failure to appoint counsel largely to allow a Sixth Amendment
violation to be shoehorned into a federal habeas corpus action at a time when the habeas statute was
interpreted to only allow collateral attack on judgments with jurisdictional defects.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 497.
46. Id. at 496.
47. Daniels v. U.S., 532 U.S. 374 (2001).
48. Lackawanna Co. Dist. Atty. v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001).
49. Id. at 403.
50. Id. at 404.
51. Lewis v. State, 457 P.2d 765 (Mont. 1969).
5
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violation of the right to counsel could not be used to enhance punishment
for another offense.52  Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Burgett, Lewis sought review of the sentence he was serving, arguing pri-
marily that his due process rights had been violated when an earlier convic-
tion was used to enhance his current sentence.53  In a short per curiam opin-
ion, the Court cited Burgett and found Lewis’ earlier conviction was void
because it violated Gideon’s right to appointed counsel.54
Nearly 30 years later, in State v. Okland,55 the Montana Supreme
Court held that Lewis required the exclusion of any constitutionally infirm
conviction from consideration at sentencing.56  Even though Lewis dealt
only with a conviction obtained in violation of the right to appointed coun-
sel, the Court in Okland cited Lewis for the proposition that, “In Montana, it
is well established that the State may not use a constitutionally infirm con-
viction to support an enhanced punishment.”57  The Court apparently as-
sumed, without ever explicitly addressing the question, that the rule an-
nounced in Burgett and adopted in Lewis prohibited enhancement of a sen-
tence based on any constitutionally infirm conviction.  The Court did not
expressly address that assumption until State v. Maine.
IV. STATE V. MAINE
A. Factual and Procedural History
On the evening of July 27, 2009, Sergeant Spencer Anderson of the
Rosebud County Sheriff’s Office found Gregory Alan Maine (“Maine”)
asleep behind the wheel of his car, which was parked on the wrong side of
the road.58  After speaking with Maine and conducting several field sobriety
tests, Sergeant Anderson arrested him for driving under the influence.59
Maine’s criminal record revealed prior DUI convictions from 1991, 1994
and 1997.60  He was accordingly charged with DUI, fourth or subsequent
offense, a felony.61
Maine moved to reduce his charge to a misdemeanor, claiming he re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel for the 1997 DUI conviction.62
52. Id. at 766.
53. Id. at 765.
54. Id. at 766.
55. Okland, 941 P.2d 431.
56. Id. at 434.
57. Id. (citing Lewis, 457 P.2d at 766).




62. Id. at 66–67.
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During a hearing on the motion, Maine testified that on July 28, 1996, he
attended a rodeo in Ingomar, Montana.63  According to Maine, at the rodeo
he drank several beers and accused his former boss of sleeping with his
wife.  This sparked an altercation that ended with five men holding Maine
down while his former boss beat him unconscious.64  Maine regained con-
sciousness, went to wash his face in a horse trough, then saw his assailants
heading toward him.65  Feeling threatened and believing Ingomar lacked a
safe haven, Maine got in his truck and fled toward Forsyth.66  About 20
miles from Ingomar, two sheriff’s deputies—responding to a report that
Maine was drunk and trying to start a fight at the rodeo—recognized
Maine’s truck driving the other direction and pulled him over.67  The depu-
ties observed cuts and abrasions on Maine.68  They administered field sobri-
ety tests and subsequently arrested Maine for DUI.69  Appointed counsel
represented Maine at trial and argued Maine was not under the influence
while driving.70  The defense proved unpersuasive and Maine was con-
victed for DUI.71  Maine apparently did not appeal the conviction.72
In his 2009 DUI, Maine moved to reduce his charge to a misdemeanor,
arguing that his attorney for the 1997 DUI failed to inform him that he
could raise a compulsion defense.73  Maine claimed his departure from In-
gomar was compelled by the threat of violence.74  He further claimed his
attorney’s failure to raise the compulsion defense constituted ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, thus rendering his conviction constitutionally infirm.75
The district court denied Maine’s motion, noting the difficulty of ascertain-
ing the viability of an affirmative defense asserted twelve years after the
original trial.76  Maine subsequently entered into a plea agreement that re-
served his right to appeal the denial of his motion.77
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Maine argued that he met
his burden below by overcoming the presumption that his prior conviction
63. Id. at 66.
64. Maine, 255 P.3d at 66.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 66–67.
67. Id. at 67.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Maine, 255 P.3d at 67.
71. Id.
72. There is no mention in the 2009 case of any appeal of the 1997 DUI.
73. Id. at 66–67 (citing State v. Leprowse, 221 P.3d 648 (Mont. 2009) (compulsion is a valid
affirmative defense to a charge of DUI)).
74. Maine, 255 P.3d at 67.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 66.
77. Id.
7
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was valid.78  Maine claimed the evidence presented at the hearing “over-
whelmingly” showed that his attorney for the 1997 DUI should have con-
sidered a compulsion defense and, by failing to do so, rendered ineffective
assistance.79  Maine argued that, per Okland, having met his burden, the
burden then shifted to the State, and the State failed to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that counsel had rendered effective assistance.80
The State countered by arguing Montana should adopt the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Custis, Daniels, and Lackawanna and limit collat-
eral attacks to denial of counsel claims.81
B. Majority Holding
The Court addressed the State’s argument by looking first at the fed-
eral jurisprudence the State urged the Court to follow.82  The Court noted
the origin of excluding constitutionally infirm convictions from sentencing
in both Burgett and Tucker.83  The Court then examined the Custis, Daniels,
and Lackawanna opinions, paying particular attention to the dissenting
opinions.84
Turning to Montana jurisprudence, the Court found that Okland pro-
hibits the enhancement of punishment based on unconstitutional convic-
tions.85  The majority first noted, “Montana law may be more protective of
individual rights than the floor established by federal law.”86  The Court
then noted Okland’s assertion that “it is well established that the State may
not use a constitutionally infirm conviction to support an enhanced punish-
ment.”87  The Court acknowledged, however, that most rights are not abso-
lute and the State has a compelling interest to deter habitual offenders as
well as an interest in the finality of convictions.88  The Court accordingly
defined its task as balancing the rights of defendants with the interests of
the State.89
Addressing the rights of defendants, the Court rejected the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s approach in Custis.  Noting the Court’s recent efforts to clar-




81. Id. at **4–5.
82. Maine, 255 P.3d at 69–72.
83. Id. at 69–70.
84. Id. at 70–72.
85. Id. at 72.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Okland, 941 P.2d at 434).
88. Maine, 255 P.3d at 72–73.
89. Id. at 73.
8
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ify the meaning of “jurisdiction,” the majority rejected the “jurisdictional
approach” of Custis, finding no standard for determining what constitutes a
jurisdictional right.90  The Court then rejected what it characterized as the
“uniqueness” standard of Custis, finding it “another arbitrary and unwork-
able approach.”91  Noting that all rights contained in Article II of the Mon-
tana Constitution are fundamental, the Court declined to pick and choose
between which rights may be asserted on collateral attack.92
The Court then turned to the State’s interest in the finality of judg-
ments and the difficulty defending against collateral attacks.  The Court re-
jected the assertion in Custis that Gideon claims do not implicate concerns
about ease of administration because they are ascertainable from the face of
the record.  The Court noted that some Gideon violations will not be ascer-
tainable from the face of the record and that Gideon claims are not necessa-
rily the only kind that will be ascertainable from the face of the record.93
According to the Court, this shows the administrative burdens inherent in
collateral attacks do not justify limiting the kinds of constitutional viola-
tions that may be asserted.94
The majority concluded the appropriate balance was struck by adher-
ing to the rule that the State may not use a constitutionally infirm conviction
to support an enhanced punishment and by continuing to use the three-part
burden shifting analysis set out in Okland, but with a slight modification.95
Okland’s framework for evaluating collateral challenges to prior convic-
tions provides that 1) a rebuttable presumption of regularity attaches to the
prior conviction; 2) the defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate that
the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm; and 3) once the defendant has
done so, the State has the burden to rebut the defendant’s evidence.96  The
Maine Court modified this framework by placing the ultimate burden of
proof on the defendant:
[T]he ultimate burden of proof—which includes the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion—shall be on the defendant, who must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conviction is invalid.  The burden is
not on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the convic-
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Custis, 511 U.S. at 494–496).  The majority’s reading of Custis here appears mis-
taken.  The Custis Court called violation of Gideon “a unique constitutional defect” to indicate the right
to appointed counsel has no like or equal.  “Strictly speaking, unique is an absolute term meaning ‘one
of a kind.’”  Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style 276 (2d ed., West 2006).  Thus,
Custis did not establish a “uniqueness standard,” as the majority says, but instead ruled that one, and
only one, constitutional right can form the basis of a collateral attack.
92. Maine, 255 P.3d at 73.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 73–74.
96. Id. at 74.
9
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tion is valid and this facet of the framework is accordingly modified to this
extent.97
Applying these standards to Maine’s claims, the Court held Maine
failed to carry his ultimate burden because he did not satisfy either of the
two prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.98  Accordingly,
the Court held Maine failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that his 1997 conviction was constitutionally infirm due to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.99
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rice concurred in the result but dissented from the majority’s
reasoning.  Justice Rice objected to what he called “[t]he creation of the
expansive right to challenge prior judgments.”100  As this implies, Justice
Rice interpreted Montana’s prior jurisprudence (specifically Okland and
Lewis) to allow collateral attacks only for violations of the right to coun-
sel.101  Justice Rice’s concerns mirror those of the Custis Court—the final-
ity of judgments and the difficulty of administration presented by collateral
challenges.102  Like the Custis Court, Justice Rice cited United States v.
Addonizio103 to express those concerns:
Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integ-
rity of our procedures.  Moreover, increased volume of judicial work associ-
ated with the processing of collateral attacks inevitably impairs and delays the
orderly administration of justice.  Because there is no limit on the time when a
collateral attack may be made, evidentiary hearings are often inconclusive and
retrials may be impossible if the attack is successful.104
Justice Rice bolstered his position by citing decisions from Arkansas,
Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, Michigan, New Hampshire, Hawaii, Wiscon-
sin, Minnesota, and Virginia that limit challenges to prior convictions based
on concerns of finality of judgments and ease of administration.105
According to Justice Rice, there are other, more appropriate mecha-
nisms in place for a defendant to challenge a sentence for constitutional
infirmities.  Justice Rice pointed out that a defendant can directly appeal his
conviction, challenge it within one year based on new evidence, or chal-
97. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
98. Maine, 255 P.3d at 74–75 (citing State v. Ankeny, 243 P.3d 391, 400 (Mont. 2010)).
99. Maine, 255 P.3d at 76.
100. Id. (Rice, J., concurring and dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 77.
103. U.S. v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
104. Maine, 255 P.3d at 77 (quoting Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184).
105. Maine, 255 P.3d at 77–80.
10
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lenge facially illegal sentences by habeas corpus.106  Those procedures, Jus-
tice Rice argued—rather than a subsequent proceeding—are the proper
venue for challenging the constitutionality of a conviction.107  Like the U.S.
Supreme Court, Justice Rice argued that Gideon violations should be the
only exception because the right to counsel is unique.108  Justice Rice—
perhaps to avoid getting bogged down in questions of the jurisdictional sig-
nificance of the right to counsel—focused on the Custis Court’s mention
that the uniqueness was “perhaps” because the right to counsel is founda-
tional to most other rights.109  In Justice Rice’s words, “the right’s unique-
ness derives from the fact that, without it, other constitutional rights could
be jeopardized because of the accused’s lack of understanding to assert
them.”110
V. ASSESSING MAINE
The Maine Court had good reason to rule the way it did.  Faced with
the choice of following or rejecting Custis, the Court did well to choose the
latter.  While empirical evidence is lacking, there doesn’t appear to be any
evidence that allowing collateral attacks to prior convictions at sentencing
previously placed an onerous burden on the courts.  If the rule that “the
State may not use a constitutionally infirm conviction to support an en-
hanced punishment”111 placed a heavy burden on Montana’s courts, neither
the courts nor commentators appear to have made much noise about it.  The
Montana Supreme Court may, however, in the future find that there are
sound reasons to restrict the holding in Maine to only those constitutional
violations that undermine the reliability of a conviction.
Maine’s impact will not be far reaching.  Contrary to the dissent’s
claim, Maine did not create a new right.112  Prior to Maine, there was noth-
ing in Montana law suggesting a limitation on the right to challenge prior
convictions used to enhance punishment for a subsequent crime. Maine
merely made explicit what had previously been assumed: that a defendant
may collaterally attack a prior conviction on the basis of any constitutional
infirmity.  Furthermore, its impact is curtailed by the new rule, which shifts
the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant.113  As will be discussed in
more detail below, the primary impact of Maine is likely to be increased
106. Id. at 77.
107. Id. at 79.
108. Id. at 78.
109. Id. (citing Custis, 511 U.S. at 494–496).
110. Maine, 255 P.3d at 78.
111. Okland, 941 P.2d at 434.
112. Maine, 255 P.3d at 76.
113. Id. at 74 (majority).
11
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awareness among criminal defense attorneys of the availability of Maine
challenges as a tool for reducing their clients’ exposure.
The kinds of cases in which trial courts are likely to see Maine chal-
lenges are predictable.  Mostly they can be expected to arise in cases in-
volving criminal statutory schemes with stacking provisions that expose a
defendant to significantly higher penalties for consecutive violations.  As
will be discussed in more detail below, by successfully attacking a prior
conviction under a statutory scheme that stacks offenses, a defendant can
significantly reduce his exposure. Maine challenges can also be expected in
cases involving statutory provisions that grant leniency to first-time offend-
ers and impose harsher sanctions on persistent offenders because they create
the same strong incentive to attack the validity of prior convictions.
A. Examining Maine’s Reasoning
The majority had good reason to rule the way it did.  The majority’s
discussion of prior federal and Montana jurisprudence establishes a solid
foundation for its holding.  As the majority’s overview of Burgett and
Tucker shows, those decisions were rightly understood to encompass claims
of any constitutional violation.114  In fact, prior to Custis, all but one of the
federal circuits interpreted Burgett and Tucker to apply to violations of
most, if not all, constitutional rights.115  Given the near-consensus among
federal circuits prior to Custis, it is surprising that many state high courts,
not bound by Custis, have nonetheless followed it.116  Thus far, Montana is
one of only three states to address the holding in Custis and not follow it.117
At least eleven states have expressly or implicitly adopted Custis.118
The Maine majority, in discussing Custis, Daniels, and Lackawanna,
mustered further support for its holding from the dissenting opinions in
those cases.  In particular, the majority relied on the arguments that: 1) it is
questionable to distinguish between right-to-appointed-counsel claims and
right-to-effective-assistance-of-counsel claims; 2) defendants will, at times,
forgo direct and collateral challenges to a conviction for practical reasons;
114. Id. at 69–70.
115. Smith, supra n. 7, at 1330.
116. See Me. v. Johnson, 38 A.3d 1270, 1275 n. 7 (Me. 2012) (collecting cases).
117. Id. (citing Cal. v. Allen, 981 P.2d 525, 537 (Cal. 1999) (rejecting Custis); Paschall v. Nev., 8
P.3d 851, 852 n. 2 (Nev. 2000) (declining to adopt Custis)).
118. Johnson, 38 A.3d at 1275 n. 7 (citing Camp v. Ark., 221 S.W.3d 365, 369–370 (Ark. 2006);
Haw. v. Veikoso, 74 P.3d 575, 582 (Haw. 2003); Idaho v. Weber, 90 P.3d 314, 319–320 (Idaho 2004);
Kan. v. Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042, 1049 (Kan. 1995); McGuire v. Ky., 885 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky. 1994);
Mich. v. Carpentier, 521 N.W.2d 195, 199–200 (Mich. 1994); N.H. v. Weeks, 681 A.2d 86, 89–90 (N.H.
1996); N.D. v. Mund, 593 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1999); Wis. v. Hahn, 618 N.W.2d 528, 529–530 (Wis.
2000); Colo. v. Padilla, 907 P.2d 601, 606 (Colo. 1995); Vt. v. Boskind, 807 A.2d 358, 360, 362–364
(Vt. 2002)).
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and 3) collateral challenges need not be unduly burdensome given appropri-
ate burden-of-proof rules.119  These arguments are persuasive, particularly
the first.  As noted above, all but one federal circuit court found Burgett and
Tucker must apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  They did so
because the reasons for allowing Gideon claims also apply to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
The Maine Court followed the logic of the federal circuit courts when
it recognized that allowing right to counsel claims and rejecting right to
effective assistance of counsel claims “makes little sense.”120  The Maine
dissent claimed the right to counsel is unique because, without it, the defen-
dant would not understand any of his other rights or know to exercise
them.121  The dissent failed to acknowledge, however, those concerns apply
equally to the right to effective assistance of counsel.  As Strickland v.
Washington122 pointed out, “the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.”123  “That a person who happens to be a lawyer is
present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the [right
to counsel].”124  Moreover, a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel is often not revealed until another attorney takes a look at the case.
As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized:
A layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel’s errors and to evalu-
ate counsel’s professional performance; consequently a criminal defendant
will rarely know that he has not been represented competently until after trial
or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about his case.125
Presumably, in most instances another attorney will not look at the case
until the defendant is accused of a later crime.
Hence, when Gideon claims are juxtaposed with Strickland claims, the
argument that Gideon claims are somehow unique can rest only on the ease
of administration in discerning Gideon violations.  When it comes to pro-
tecting a right that is often necessary for the effective assertion of other
rights, difficulty of administration in determining whether that right has
been violated does not seem a sufficient reason to denigrate that right.
Beyond right to counsel claims, the Maine Court also rightly allowed
challenges based on other constitutional violations.  Coerced confessions,
guilty pleas entered unwittingly or involuntarily, or denial of the right to a
fair and impartial jury, all undermine confidence in the offender’s guilt.
When looking at the practice of challenging prior convictions for constitu-
119. Maine, 255 P.3d at 70–72.
120. Id. at 73.
121. Id. at 78 (Rice, J., concurring and dissenting).
122. Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
123. Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
124. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
125. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986).
13
Leisher: Examining Montana's Right to Attack Unconstitutional Prior Convic
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 14 25-MAR-13 9:29
196 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 74
tional violations, it’s worth noting why those constitutional rights exist in
the first place.  Many of the rights given criminal defendants exist largely to
protect the integrity of the truth-finding process—that is, they make convic-
tions more reliable.  Anglo-American culture has long abhorred punishment
of the innocent.126  The problem with enhancing a sentence based on an
unconstitutional prior conviction is that it raises the specter of again punish-
ing the innocent for a crime he did not commit.  Accordingly, it’s commen-
surate with values fundamental to our justice system to allow a defendant to
show he should not receive enhanced punishment for a prior, unreliable
conviction.
Finally, the majority in Maine effectively countered the dissent’s claim
that it created a new rule.  The majority did so by quoting Okland’s asser-
tion that, “In Montana it is well established that the State may not use a
constitutionally infirm conviction to support an enhanced punishment.”127
As the majority explained, this assertion is supported by the rule in Mon-
tana protecting defendants from being sentenced based on misinforma-
tion128 and the characterization of infirm convictions as “misinformation of
constitutional magnitude.”129  The dissent’s claim that the preexisting rule
in Montana was limited to Gideon violations does not appear entirely accu-
rate.
B. Potential Future Treatment
In future cases, the Montana Supreme Court may find there is good
reason to restrict Maine challenges.  There are compelling arguments that
collateral attacks on the constitutionality of a prior conviction should only
be permitted where the constitutional right asserted affects the reliability of
the conviction.  If the issue is presented, the Montana Supreme Court may
wish to adopt such a limitation.
In considering Custis, the Maine Court had three options.  First, it
could have followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach (also followed by
the Third Circuit pre-Custis) and allow collateral attacks at sentencing only
in the event of Gideon violations.  As discussed earlier, the Maine Court
had good reason to decline that option.  The second option was to allow
collateral attacks at sentencing based on any constitutional violation, which
the Court chose.  The third option—not raised by either party and not con-
sidered by the Court—was to distinguish between rights that affect the reli-
126. “That it is better 100 guilty Persons should escape than that one innocent Person should suffer,
is a Maxim that has been long and generally approved.” The Writings of Benjamin Franklin vol. 9, 293
(Albert H. Smyth ed., The MacMillan Co. 1907).
127. Maine, 255 P.3d at 72 (quoting Okland, 941 P.2d at 434).
128. Maine, 255 P.3d at 72 (citing State v. Phillips, 159 P.3d 1078 (Mont. 2007)).
129. Maine, 255 P.3d at 72 (quoting Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447).
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ability of a conviction and those that do not.  Prior to Custis, the Ninth
Circuit developed such an approach.
In Tisnado v. United States,130 the Ninth Circuit held that Fourth
Amendment violations do not implicate the concerns underlying the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Tucker.131  The Ninth Circuit relied on the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Stone v. Powell132 for the proposition that “all
constitutional claims do not rest on identical considerations for all pur-
poses.”133 Stone barred state prisoners from seeking federal habeas review
of Fourth Amendment claims that had already been fully and fairly litigated
in state courts.134  The Ninth Circuit interpreted Stone as distinguishing
Fourth Amendment from other constitutional claims “on the basis of their
effect on the integrity of the truthfinding process.”135  Reasoning from that
basis, the Ninth Circuit declined to allow Fourth Amendment claims to
form the basis for a collateral attack at sentencing on the validity of a prior
conviction because illegal searches and seizures do not raise concerns about
the integrity of the truth finding process.  The reasoning has obvious appeal.
A conviction obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not un-
dermine the reliability of the conviction.  Quite the opposite in fact, illegal
searches and seizures often reveal highly probative evidence such as confes-
sions, drugs, and weapons.
In the context of Montana’s constitutional rights, at least two do not
implicate any concerns about the truth finding process.  Article II, section
11 of Montana’s constitution, like the Fourth Amendment, protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.  The Maine holding’s broad scope
would allow challenges to prior convictions based on section 11 violations
even though such violations do not undermine confidence in the conviction.
Similarly, claims premised on violation of Article II, section 22’s right to be
free from excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment do not under-
mine confidence in the reliability of a conviction.  Again, however, the
Maine holding allows collateral attacks based on any Article II right.
Hence, a defendant could conceivably launch a successful collateral attack
against a prior conviction because he was fined twice the statutory maxi-
mum.136  If the Montana Supreme Court again addresses the scope of the
130. Tisnado v. U.S., 547 F.2d 452 (1976).
131. Id. at 458.
132. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
133. Tisnado, 547 F.2d at 458 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n. 31).
134. Stone, 428 U.S at 494.
135. Tisnado, 547 F.2d at 458.
136. While it might be argued that violation of Article II, section 22 renders the defendant’s previous
sentence infirm, but not his conviction, Montana’s criminal code treats the two as interchangeable. See
Bingman v. State, 122 P.3d 1235, 1238–1239 (Mont. 2005) (Cotter, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Snell,
103 P.3d 503, 507–508 (Mont. 2004)).
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right to collaterally attack prior convictions at sentencing, it may wish to
consider the reasoning of Tisnado and exclude from consideration claims
based on sections 11 and 22 because they do not undermine the reliability
of a conviction.
C. Implications of Maine
While Maine did not herald a new right in Montana, by drawing atten-
tion to that right it may increase the frequency with which it is asserted.
Maine challenges are likely to show up mostly in cases where repeat of-
fenders are subject to significant sentence enhancement for a prior convic-
tion—particularly, charges for fourth DUIs,137 charges for second and third
partner or family member assaults,138 sentencing for persistent felony of-
fenders,139 and sentencing for second drug offenses.140
The most frequent use of Maine so far has been in DUI cases where
the defendant’s guilt is reasonably clear and the defendant has three or more
prior DUI convictions.141  In Montana, fourth and subsequent DUIs are
treated as felonies while first, second, and third DUIs are misdemeanors.142
An attorney defending a client on a fourth or fifth DUI charge may have no
avenue to protect the client from becoming a felon other than to attack the
constitutionality of the client’s prior convictions.  DUI defense practice
manuals frequently advise attorneys defending DUIs to attack the validity
of prior convictions in order to reduce their client’s exposure.143
Maine challenges can also be expected in cases of domestic violence.
Under Montana’s partner or family member assault (“PFMA”) statute, re-
peat offenders are subject to progressively higher penalties.144  Under the
statute, first and second offenders receive low minimum jail sentences (24
and 72 hours, respectively) and a maximum sentence of one year.  Third
and subsequent offenders receive a minimum jail sentence of 30 days and a
maximum of five years.  Like fourth DUIs, third PFMA cases make Maine
challenges attractive because a defendant drops to a much lower level of
137. Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–731 (2011).
138. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–206(3)(a).
139. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46–18–501 to 503.
140. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–9–102(7).
141. As of this writing, the rule announced in Maine has been raised in four cases in front of the
Montana Supreme Court.  All four were appeals from convictions for a fourth DUI. See State v. Ches-
terfield, 262 P.3d 1109 (Mont. 2011); State v. Chaussee, 259 P.3d 783 (Mont. 2011); State v. Hass, 265
P.3d 1221 (Mont. 2011); State v. Burns, 256 P.3d 944 (Mont. 2011).
142. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 61–8–731, 714.
143. See e.g. Flem Whited, III & Donald H. Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation: Criminal and
Civil vol. 1, § 3:1 (2d ed., West Aug. 2012) (“Because the existence of a prior conviction allows en-
hancement, it is most advantageous to attack the prior conviction in order to avoid enhancement.”).
144. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–206(3)(a).
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exposure if he can show a constitutional infirmity in one of his prior convic-
tions.
Maine challenges can also be expected when the State seeks to sen-
tence a defendant as a persistent felony offender.  Under Montana law, a
defendant who incurs two felonies within a five-year period can be desig-
nated a persistent felony offender, which increases the minimum sentence
to five years imprisonment and the maximum sentence to 100 years.145  An
attorney whose client is facing sentencing as a persistent felony offender
will likely want to raise a Maine challenge in the hopes of invalidating the
prior felony.
Finally, Maine is also likely to be raised in cases where the defendant
is charged with a second drug offense.  Defendants charged with a first drug
offense in Montana are presumptively entitled to a deferred sentence.146  If
the defendant can show the first drug conviction suffered from any kind of
constitutional defect, the deferred sentence for a first-time drug offense
would become available again.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Maine Court had good reason to reject Custis.  Between 1967
when Burgett announced the rule that a current sentence could not be en-
hanced based on an unconstitutional prior sentence and 1994 when Custis
limited the scope of that rule, all but one of the federal circuit courts to
consider the issue held the Burgett Court’s rationale for barring the use of a
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon must apply to other constitu-
tional rights as well.147  The arguments for limiting collateral attacks on
prior convictions at sentencing to only claims of Gideon violations are un-
persuasive.148  Faced with the decision of either following Custis or re-
jecting it, the Montana Supreme Court wisely chose to reject it.  It may find
in the future, however, that there are good reasons to restrict the scope of
Maine to exclude claims that don’t undermine confidence in the reliability
of a prior conviction.
145. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46–18–501 to 503.
146. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–9–102(7).  Absent significant aggravating circumstances, sentencing
courts must give a deferred imposition of sentence to a first time drug offender. State v. Bolt, 664 P.2d
322, 324 (Mont. 1983).
147. Paul D. Leake, Limits to the Collateral Use of Invalid Prior Convictions to Enhance Punish-
ment for a Subsequent Offense: Extending Burgett v. Texas and United States v. Tucker, 19 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 123, 136 (1987) (discussing breadth of application of Burgett and Tucker in the
federal circuit courts).
148. Id. at 136–139 (criticizing the Third Circuit’s decision to restrict application of Burgett to con-
victions invalid under Gideon); Smith, supra n. 7, at 1346 (criticizing Custis).
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